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BOOK REVIEWS

Brennan, Geoffrey; Eriksson, Lina; Goodin, Robert E.; and Southwood, Nicholas. Explaining Norms.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 290. $55.00 ðclothÞ.
Explaining Norms is a work in philosophy of social science aspiring to provide an
account of norms, their general character, their kinds ðformal, legal, moral, and
socialÞ, what they can explain, and what explains their dynamic ðemergence, persistence, and unravelingÞ. The authors engage with various positions in ethics,
political philosophy, and ðto some extentÞ the philosophy of law. The discussion
is rewarding and inventive—it provides distinctive and intriguing views on several topics ðe.g., on the distinction between moral and social normsÞ. There are a
lot of ideas here. Perhaps this is predictable, given that the work is a product of
four capable minds. What is surprising is the range of ideas and arguments on
which the authors manage to agree and out of which they construct one reasonably cohesive account.
Given the wide range of literatures discussed, readers are likely to find much
of interest. Not surprisingly, some related literatures do seem to be underplayed—
treated in a few footnotes and somewhat by the way, with little development of
systematic connections. There are thriving literatures in comparative psychology/
ethology, moral psychology, and cultural anthropology that are devoted to how
we humans manage to cooperate and coordinate as we do. While there are footnotes to some of this literature ðsee the index for, e.g., Boyd, Bowles, Camerer,
Gintis, and HenrichÞ, many readers would have benefited from a discussion that
more fully related the position developed in Explaining Norms to that work in experimental economics and anthropology. Discussing the relationships with work
in moral psychology and ethology would also have been appreciated ðHaidt, de
Waal, and Tomasello are not mentionedÞ. Still, there is very much to like about
what is treated here.
The authors seek conceptually individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for being a norm. On the account provided, norms are something on
the order of normative principles accepted in some group ð3–4Þ. Thus, norms
involve some normative principle, possessing “a certain generality of scope and
application.” These principles need not be objectively correct or fitting, and they
may be objectively “simply awful” ð3Þ. The central questions have to do with what
is involved in some group accepting these normative principles. The authors
locate their position in two dimensions.
First, there are individualistic and holistic accounts of acceptance. Individualistic accounts hold that “to be accepted in a particular group or community
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just is for certain things to be true of ðsome significant portion ofÞ the individual
members of that group” ð4Þ. In contrast, holistic accounts hold that acceptance
requires that certain things be true of the group as a whole, where these cannot
be reduced to things that are true of the individual members of the group. The
authors develop an individualistic account.
Second, there are reductive and nonreductive accounts of acceptance.
These differ over whether the idea of ‘accepting a rule or normative principle’ is
itself to be understood in “non-normative or normative terms.” According to reductive accounts, for a norm to be accepted in a particular group “just is for certain non-normative truths to hold of either ðsome significant portion ofÞ the individuals or the group as a whole” ð4Þ. What supposedly is it for acceptance to be
a normative truth or matter? Here, the authors make much of whether the relevant
folk adopt “normative attitudes,” rather than merely ðfor exampleÞ desiring or
preferring that folk conform to the principle. Apparently, desires or preferences
having to do with conformity to normative principles count as nonnormative
facts or truths, while folk adopting normative attitudes in connection with that
normative principle constitute normative matters or truths in the relevant sense.
ðFor the authors, there is no suggestion here that folk who accept some normative principle in this normative sense really ought to conform to that principle.
What is at stake is just whether their acceptance involves stances that are themselves contentfully richer than mere preference structures and behaviors.Þ While
I find the authors’ way of writing of normative and nonnormative matters jarring
ðI would generally not think of folk adopting normative stances in connection
with some principle a “normative truth”Þ, I suppose it occasions no misunderstanding, once noted.
The authors pursue a nonreductive account of norms. They believe that
their combination of individualism and nonreductionism is nonstandard. Individualism and reductive accounts are commonly allied. Holistic and nonreductive accounts are commonly allied.
As the authors understand the territory, reductive accounts tend to fall into
two clusters: those that treat norms as practices ðas conventions or customsÞ and
those that treat norms as clusters of desires or preferences. A social practice is
here understood as “a regularity in behavior among the members of a group that
is explained, in part, by the presence within the group of pro-attitudes ðor beliefs
about the presence of pro-attitudesÞ towards the relevant behavior that are a matter of common knowledge among members of the group” ð16Þ. Paradigmatic
accounts of norms as conventions understand these as equilibria behavior in a
game played repeatedly—as a solution rooted in preferences and some common
knowledge. Lewis advanced an early and influential version on conventions.
To show that social practice accounts are mistaken regarding the conditions
sufficient for there being a norm, the authors adduce the thought experiment of
Imelda’s Inn ð18Þ. Here some group of individuals, fond of each other’s company, meet regularly for noon lunch ðalthough other times would have suited as
wellÞ at a particular place ðwhich is not the unique convenient placeÞ. Loathing
normative rules or principles, they repudiate any coordinating normative principle and would not enjoy their gathering were they to have thought others
thought that their showing up was subject to any normative requirement. In-
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dividuals within this lunching group would not normatively evaluate others
within the group, were they not to show up. The authors insist that, with no place
for normative attitudes, there would be no norm here—although there is a conventional practice.
The authors also argue that social practices are not necessary for there being
a norm. In their thought experiment of the Moldovans ð20Þ, they characterize a
people most of whom judge that one ought not U ðurinate in public swimming
poolsÞ, are disposed to disapprove of anyone U-ing, and are disposed to think
such disapproval fitting. Still, most Moldovans do U, and most feel guilty upon
U-ing and hide their U-ing. The Moldovans apparently do have a norm of not
U-ing, although they do not have a social practice of not U-ing.
Other reductive accounts understand norms as “clusters of non-normative
attitudes”—specifically as “clusters of desires ðpossibly accompanied by certain
non-normative beliefsÞ” ð22Þ. Such norms-as-desires accounts do allow that there
may be norms that are commonly violated. Thus, these accounts recognize that
norms are not social practices.
The authors judge accounts in terms of conditional ðrather than unconditionalÞ desires the most promising ð23–24Þ of these accounts. They focus on
Bicchieri’s account, which they gloss this way:
A normative principle P is a norm within group G if a significant proportion
of the members of G prefer to comply with P on the condition that
a. A significant proportion of members of G comply with P; and
b. Either
i. A significant proportion of the members of G expect her to
comply with P; or
ii. A significant proportion of the members of G expect her to
comply with P, prefer her to comply with P, and may sanction
her for not complying with P. ð24Þ
Clause ðaÞ is probably a minor distortion, in that Christina Bicchieri ðThe Grammar of Society ½New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 11–12Þ explicitly allows for norms that are not social practices. On Bicchieri’s account, clause ðbÞ is
pivotal. The central attitude invoked there is a kind of conditional preference.
Desires ðpreferencesÞ themselves are not normative attitudes.
The authors argue that satisfying Bicchieri’s account would not be sufficient
for a group to have a norm: they consider a people, the Chastians. Among these
chaste folk, significantly many actually conceive of a different, very nonchaste,
principle or code, which they secretly conditionally prefer ð25Þ. As the case is developed, the nonchaste principle would constitute the Chastians’ norm on the
conditional preference account of norms. Yet is seems right to say that their
norms are the chaste principles, not the alternative principles.
The authors also suggest reasons to think that conditional preference accounts do not capture necessary conditions for there being norms. Among the
Philanthropians, virtually all members judge that one must donate one-half of
one’s income to help feed the poor, are disposed to disapprove of those donating
less, and are disposed to regard such attitudes as appropriate. Yet we are asked to
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suppose that these Philanthropians generally do not unconditionally desire to
so behave, nor do they conditionally so prefer. They do not care what others do
with their money and simply prefer to buy luxury goods themselves. As a result,
they do not so donate.
The authors insist that the Philanthropians have a norm. But, one may
wonder about the case itself. The Philanthropians supposedly disapprove of those
that do not so donate. Thus, they think it wrong not to so donate. But they don’t
care what others do with their money? I have reservations about the moral and
related psychology that must be supposed in this case. It is hard to make sense of
folk with normative stances without having some corresponding conditional desires or preferences. It seems that the normative attitudes supposed to be had by
the Philanthropians plausibly would involve some caring.
Ultimately, Explaining Norms advances an account of norms turning on “Pcorresponding normative attitudes.” These are normative attitudes “appropriately reflecting the content and normative force of ” the relevant normative principle,
P. Normative attitudes include:
aÞ
bÞ
cÞ
dÞ

Normative beliefs, judgments and other cognitive states,
Normative expectations,
Reactive attitudes and dispositions to have ðaÞ or ðbÞ,
Any attitude entailing a–c. ð29Þ

A normative principle P is said to be a norm within a group G if and only if:
i. A significant proportion of the members of G have P-corresponding
normative attitudes; and
ii. A significant proportion of the members of G know that a significant
proportion of the members of G have P-corresponding normative attitudes. ð29Þ
This account of norms is worth careful reflection. It should be attractive to one
who ðlike myselfÞ is sympathetic to the idea that an adequate account of norms
will need to turn on various normative attitudes. Arguably, much of the contemporary work in moral psychology and evolutionary game theory is devoted to
understanding the character of such judgments, expectations, and reactive attitudes. Accounts of norms in terms of preferences should own up to the importance of such attitudes.
The authors advertise their account as “interesting and important” in part
because it is supposed to have implications for what is the function of norms—
for “what they are for” ð35Þ. Rejecting two familiar ideas, the authors argue that
the function of norms is neither facilitating coordination nor facilitating cooperation. While norms do sometimes contribute to coordination and cooperation, understanding “the core function” of norms primarily in these terms is
said to be a mistake ð35Þ. Their “core function” is said to be a matter of making
folk accountable—where “accountability involves . . . others having a recognized
right or entitlement to determine how one ought to behave” ð36Þ.
I must admit that I find the arguments here rather puzzling. It certainly can
be said that, on the account advanced, norms do make for a “recognized entitlement”—as it treats “recognition” ðin the sociological senseÞ of some applica-
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tions of some normative principle by folk in the relevant group as conceptually
constituting their having a norm. “Recognition” of entitlements then is constitutive of there being a norm. But, to call this “the function” of norms seems
analogous to saying that the function of automobiles is automotive transportation. Further, it is somewhat obscure just how the authors would have us understand the notion of “a function.” There are two prominent accounts of
functions in the philosophy of science. On the account articulated by Robert
Cummins ðThe Nature of Psychological Explanation ½Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1983Þ, a function is a causal relationship that features in an analysis of a ðperhaps complexÞ disposition or capacity of a class of systems. On the account articulated by Larry Wright ðTeleological Explanation ½Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976Þ, a function is a causal/functional relationship featuring in
a kind of selection explanation of the items involved in that relationship. However, it is plausible that coordination and cooperation facilitation ðas well as accountabilityÞ constitutes both Cummins-style and Wright-style functions of norms.
The fact that a significant proportion of a group “have P-corresponding normative attitudes” may feature in an analysis of a social system that accounts for
a kind of equilibrium in which folk are held or judged accountable. But, depending on the relevant principle, P, the equilibrium afforded by the norm will
afford a form of social coordination or cooperation that would not be incidental
to the analysis or explanation.
The authors discuss various kinds of norms. Formal norms are those in
which application—including punishment—is delegated to some power, office,
or group. These are found fitting only when they regulate actions. Informal
norms are those the application of which is not delegated, so that they must be
interpreted and applied by a substantial number of the norm holders themselves.
The authors also distinguish between moral norms and social norms. Here
they reject the idea that the distinction can be drawn on the basis of certain
“purely formal” features of the principles: their scope, their being conditional or
unconditional, or their having normativity in being “intrinsically motivating” or
rooted in certain reactive attitudes ð59Þ. The authors also argue against distinguishing moral and social norms in terms of the content of the normative principles involved. Both moral and social norms can call on others to be other regarding, or impartial, or to respect individuals qua individuals. They insist that
moral norms may lack such content features and that social norms may possess
such content features. Their central positive idea is this: the motivation for the
judgment is separable from the content of the judgment—and whether a judgment is a moral judgment turns on the grounds in the agents’ minds for their
judgment. This suggests that we should distinguish moral norms from social
norms, not by the contents of the principles involved but by the grounds featured in the minds of the norm holders ð58Þ. Moral norms are said to be “constituted by attitudes that are necessarily practice-independent in the sense that presumed social practices may constitute no part of their grounds” ð59Þ. Social
Norms, in contrast, are said to be “constituted by attitudes that are necessarily
grounded, in part, in presumed social practices” ð59Þ.
This intriguing suggestion seems on its face to have the implication that
common norms for such matters as fidelity within marriage turn out to be social
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norms rather than moral norms—presumably most norm holders have motivating attitudes in which the social institution and practice of marriage plays a
part. Again, the authors’ rich discussion is worth careful attention. They discuss
cases in which a social practice may feature in the thought of the norm holders
yet do so in “a wholly derivative way” ð68–70Þ. In a footnote ð70 n. 36Þ they consider a case in which the agent takes there to be some social practice, P, takes the
social practice P to make for valuable results, and takes the preservation and
protection of such practices/results to be obligatory ðor morally significant independent of some social practiceÞ. In such cases, the practice is said to enter
into the thinking of the agent in a merely derivative way.
One wonders whether this line of thought threatens to turn most social
norms into moral norms. The concern may be put in terms of the emerging literature on the general motivations for norm conformity. It seems plausible that
much norm conformity is motivated by a suite of emotions that are not clearly
distinct from the kinds of moral dimensions that Haidt has discussed: care/harm,
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation.
The evolution of the disposition to these may be associated with several adaptive
challenges: “caring for vulnerable children, forming partnerships with non-kin to
reap the benefits of reciprocity, forming coalitions to compete with other coalitions, negotiating status hierarchies, and keeping oneself and one’s kin free from
parasites and pathogens, which spread quickly when people live in close proximity
to each other” ð Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind ½New York: Random House,
2011, 112Þ. It certainly seems plausible that the grounding motivation of many
norm adherents turns on sensitivities to things like harmfulness, loyalty, authority,
and fairness to those with whom one is mutually reliant. In such cases, do the
norms apparently constitute moral norms? There is much to be sorted out here.
But the issues and discussion are rewarding.
As befitting its title, the second part of Explaining Norms is focused on the
dynamics by which norms arise and evolve. The authors seek to draw on elements
from two different approaches to the dynamics of norms—the rational purposeful action approach and the ‘social meanings’ approach. Ultimately, it is
said, “a full explanation of norms will inevitably have to incorporate elements of
both in some measure” ð91Þ.
The authors focus on the dynamics of informal norms. To understand their
dynamics, it is said, one must understand how folk, as a folk or a ‘we’, come to
authorize themselves to issue the principles or norms and interpret and apply
those principles to each other and themselves individually. These groups must
get enough of the individuals that comprise them to come to accept the principle and to regard certain applications as the correct ones and to hold others
accountable in ways that enough think fitting ð94 –95Þ. This is characterized as
“bootstrapping norms.”
Norms might be bootstrapped in several ways—and the authors discuss four.
First, there is a relatively formal two-step process possible: when actors first obtain a set of articulate ‘I will if you will’ promises, then note that enough others
have so committed, so that enough of the actors have effectively accepted the
rule that is the focus of the norm. This process seems most characteristic of
nation-states as agents settling on norms or conventions. Second, there are cases
in which norms emerge by way of “free-flowing cascades.” In such cases there is
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among the group a “bandwagon-style mechanism driven by differential sensitivities” ð98Þ. Here one finds sensitivities to various costs, benefits, and ranges of
information—including information about others’ sensitivities and conditional
acceptances ð99Þ. A third possibility involves something like a cascade among a
“power-differentiated” class who then leads in arriving at the emerging norm.
Finally, a fourth route to the formation of a norm involves the transformation of
a social practice or convention into a norm. Here “non-normative behavioural
regularities that serve a coordination-facilitation function metamorphose into
something normative that serves an accountability-creating function” ð101Þ.
The authors discuss several bases for norm persistence turning on actor’s
investments and sunk costs associated with extant norms, the costs of converting
were other norms adopted, interests and loss aversion, and self-fulfilling expectations informed by extant norms. The book also provides a useful characterization of the ways in which norms can change or unravel. One interesting twist
here involves the relation between norms of various kinds and associated social
practices. While these are treated as conceptually distinct matters, it is acknowledged that norms often are conditioned by expectations regarding the behavior and thought of others. Thus, insofar as folk’s expectations are sensitive to
actual patterns of social practice, changes in social practice can unravel norms
ð113–18Þ.
Explaining norms is thus a matter of understanding processes of the sort
just crudely categorized. One approach to understanding these processes is to
attempt a rational reconstruction of them. This would “show how the norm
solves a specific problem that purposive agents might have—like helping them
coordinate their behavior or cooperate despite the temptation to cheat—and
how it is in most people’s interest to comply with it” ð133Þ. Here, one treats the
norm as a solution to a game-theoretic problem faced by a set of rational agents.
As the authors note, the explanation afforded is typically understood as an
explanation of why norms emerge in light of an agent’s purposes, not of how
they emerge. As such, the explanation would provide an incomplete understanding of norms and their dynamic. But, the authors also focus on something of a
problem or limitation of such purposive explanations: “not all norms are unqualifiedly good ones, in that not all norms provide a real or unqualified solution to
game-theoretic problems faced” ð143Þ. Ultimately, the authors suggest that the
rational reconstructions are only explanatory insofar as they dovetail with understandings of how the relevant norms arise and that this turns upon identifying
the mechanism by which norm acceptance emerges within the group in question.
How-questions and why-questions cannot be neatly separated ð143–47, 154Þ.
A second broad approach to understanding the processes by which norms
emerge and change proceeds in terms of social meanings—what the norms and
practices “say about” one’s self, one’s community, one’s place in one’s community, and the like. The authors suggest that in accounting for the full dynamic of
norms, one will need to make use of both approaches.
David K. Henderson
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

